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The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game

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  • Brian Roberson
  • Dmitriy Kvasov

Abstract

The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players’ resources are “use it or lose it” in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players’ budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a oneto- one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players’ budgets exceeds the threshold this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1252.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1252

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Keywords: Colonel Blotto Game; All-Pay Auction; Contests; Mixed Strategies;

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References

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  1. Sergiu Hart, 2008. "Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 441-460, March.
  2. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," MPRA Paper 46810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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  7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of Alliances," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 653-676, 08.
  8. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2010. "A simple mechanism for resolving conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 375-391, November.
  9. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May.
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  13. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 331-343, May.
  14. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Subhasish Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2013. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 833-861, April.
  2. Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 2753, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2012. "Competition for a Majority," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 2104, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. Kai Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2012. "Introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 241-245, October.
  5. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 12-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  6. John Duffy & Alexander Matros, 2013. "Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 509, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.
  7. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  8. Florian Morath & Johannes Münster, 2013. "Information acquisition in conflicts," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 99-129, September.
  9. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 331-343, May.

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