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The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets

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  • Dan Kovenock
  • Brian Roberson

Abstract

This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. In this context, our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric attack and defense as a conflict between “fully” strategic actors with endogenous entry and force expenditure decisions as well as allowing for general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks of targets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1251.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1251

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Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric Conflict; Attack and Defense; Weakest-Link; Best-Shot;

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References

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  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," MPRA Paper 6097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Hausken, Kjell, 2008. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 186(2), pages 856-881, April.
  4. Ian Gale & Mark Stegeman, 1994. "Exclusion in all-pay auctions," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 9401, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  6. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
  7. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, 08.
  8. Azaiez, M.N. & Bier, Vicki M., 2007. "Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 181(2), pages 773-786, September.
  9. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9409002, EconWPA.
  10. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
  11. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  12. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, 01.
  13. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sudipta Sarangi & Dan Kovenock & Matt Wiser, . "All-Pay Hex: A Multibattle Contest With Complementarities," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University 2012-06, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  4. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman, 2012. "Fight or Flight?," MPRA Paper 52130, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2013. "Network Security and Contagion," NBER Working Papers 19174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," MPRA Paper 46810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Michael McBride & David Hewitt, 2012. "The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks," Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics 121307, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  8. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  9. Aloni, Elad & Sela, Aner, 2012. "The assortative matching scheme in a survival battle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 272-275.
  10. Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 2753, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Larson, Nathan, 2011. "Network security," MPRA Paper 32822, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1268, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  13. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013. "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-43.
  14. Baba Yumiko, 2012. "A Note on a Comparison of Simultaneous and Sequential Colonel Blotto Games," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 6, December.
  15. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  16. B. Hoyer, 2013. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.

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