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Abstract

This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. In this context, our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric attack and defense as a conflict between “fully” strategic actors with endogenous entry and force expenditure decisions as well as allowing for general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks of targets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1251.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1251

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Postal: Krannert Building, West Lafayette, IN 47907
Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd
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Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric Conflict; Attack and Defense; Weakest-Link; Best-Shot;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
• D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2010-09-11 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2010-09-11 (Game Theory)
• NEP-NET-2010-09-11 (Network Economics)

References

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Britta Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
2. Larson, Nathan, 2011. "Network security," MPRA Paper 32822, University Library of Munich, Germany.
3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock J. & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1268, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   
   • Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 521-524, October.
5. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Working Papers 10-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   
   • Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1256, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   • Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," CESifo Working Paper Series 3211, CESifo Group Munich.
6. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
7. Sudipta Sarangi & Dan Kovenock & Matt Wiser, . "All-Pay Hex: A Multibattle Contest With Complementarities," Departmental Working Papers 2012-06, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
8. Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series 2753, CESifo Group Munich.

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