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Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo
  • Gale, Ian

Abstract

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying expenditures. They showed that a cap may lead to (1) greater expected aggregate expenditures and (2) a less efficient allocation of a political prize. In their comment, Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein (2005) show that if the cap is not rigid (i.e., its effect on the cost of lobbying is continuous) it has no effect.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6097.

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Date of creation: 15 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6097

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References

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
  3. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
  4. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers, School Of Economics, University College Dublin 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
  2. Kline, Brendan, 2009. "A restriction on lobbyist donations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 129-132, September.
  3. Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," MPRA Paper 47587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
  5. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
  6. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.
  7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
  9. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers, Brock University, Department of Economics 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
  10. Ron Seigel, 2009. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000201, David K. Levine.
  11. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp662, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  12. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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