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Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences

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Author Info
Ivan Pastine (University College Dublin)
Tuvana Pastine (National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

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Abstract

With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral on the expected cost of contributions nor on the policy outcome. Furthermore more restrictive caps can lead to increased aggregate contributions. When the penalty for exceeding the cap is small enough that it is impossible to suppress all contributions, the influence of money on policy is minimized with a binding but non-zero cap and maximized with no cap.

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File URL: http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp09.12.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School Of Economics, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number 200912.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 07 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200912

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Related research
Keywords: All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; soft money; explicit ceiling; BCRA.;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Snyder, James M, Jr, 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1195-1227, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2008. "Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1991208.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
  4. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
  9. Kai Konrad, 2002. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Levitt, Steven D, 1995. "Policy Watch: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 183-93, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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