Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ivan Pastine

    ()
    (Economics,UCD, Dublin 4.)

  • Tuvana Pastine

    ()
    (Economics Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://economics.nuim.ie/sites/economics.nuim.ie/files/working-papers/N1991208.pdf
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify ()
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n1991208.pdf.

    as in new window
    Length: 34 pages
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1991208.pdf

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Maynooth, Co. Kildare
    Phone: 353-1-7083728
    Fax: 353-1-7083934
    Web page: http://economics.nuim.ie
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
    2. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political Campaign Spending Limits," Working Papers 201034, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1991208.pdf. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.