Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying
AbstractThe effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n1991208.pdf.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2009-01-17 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010.
"Political Campaign Spending Limits,"
201034, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political Campaign Spending Limits," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n213-10.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.