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Policy Watch: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform

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Author Info
Levitt, Steven D

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Abstract

While campaign finance reform attracts a lot of attention, it seems unlikely that such reform, at least in it current guise, will have a large impact on the functioning of the American political system. Recent studies have called into question the conventional wisdom that challenger campaign spending is especially effective, suggesting that attempts to close the gap between incumbent and challenger spending will have a smaller-than-expected impact on election outcomes. While it is safe to conclude that PACs wield some influence, it is not clear that limiting cash contributions will have a substantial effect. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 183-93
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:183-93

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  1. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies," Discussion Paper 123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Andrea Prat & Riccardo Puglisi & James Snyder, 2005. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000960, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  4. Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  5. Christopher Magee, 1999. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Economics Working Paper Archive 292, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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