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Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?

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Author Info
Thomas Stratmann
Francisco J.
Aparicio-Castillo ()

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Abstract

This paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes. States are a natural laboratory to examine this issue. We analyze elections to Assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates' vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions. We find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate. Limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents, but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation. We also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-1252-x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 127 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 177-206
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:127:y:2006:i:1:p:177-206

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuno-OrtIn, 2000. "Public Funding of Political Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Mueller, Dennis C & Stratmann, Thomas, 1994. " Informative and Persuasive Campaigning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 55-77, October.
  7. Angrist, Joshua D., 1991. "Grouped-data estimation and testing in simple labor-supply models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 243-266, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
  9. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June. [Downloadable!]
  10. Milyo, Jeffrey & Groseclose, Timothy, 1999. "The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 699-722, October.
  11. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  12. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David M. Primo & Jeffrey D. Milyo, 2003. "Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States," Working Papers 0315, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo, 2005. "Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States," Working Papers 0513, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00126910_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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