A restriction on lobbyist donations
AbstractThis paper studies the consequences of a fine for violating a ceiling on permissible donations in a competition for a political prize. Increasing the fine can increase or decrease the amount of expected donations in equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 104 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Lobbying All-pay auction;
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- Nicolas Sahuguet, 2006. "Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8.
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0506-15, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
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