Vote or Shout
AbstractWe examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22122.
Date of creation: 14 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
majority voting; voting procedures; social efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- Chakravarty Surajeet & Kaplan Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, September.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Vote or Shout," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1006, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-04-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-04-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-04-24 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
- Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010.
"The Benefits of Costly Voting,"
21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan & Gareth Myles, 2010. "The Benefits of Costly Voting," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1005, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, 04.
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