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Abstract

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/587624
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 116 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 351-380

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:116:y:2008:i:2:p:351-380

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:

1. What if one could buy votes?
   by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-12-18 12:07:00

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Cited by:

1. Crutzen, Benoît S.Y. & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2009. "Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 264-279, January.
   
   • Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
3. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," MPRA Paper 22122, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 10(1), pages 42.
   • Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Vote or Shout," Discussion Papers 1006, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
4. Baland, Jean-Marie & Robinson, James A, 2011. "The Political Value of Land: Democratization and Land Prices in Chile," CEPR Discussion Papers 8296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
6. Hans Gersbach & Felix Mühe, 2008. "Vote-Buying and Growth," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/94, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
   
   • Gersbach, Hans & Mühe, Felix, 2011. "Vote-Buying And Growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(05), pages 656-680, November.

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