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Vote Buying: General Elections

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Author Info

  • Eddie Dekel
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Asher Wolinsky

Abstract

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 116 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 351-380

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:116:y:2008:i:2:p:351-380

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. What if one could buy votes?
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-12-18 12:07:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Chakravarty Surajeet & Kaplan Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, September.
  2. Paul Collier & Pedro Vicente, 2012. "Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 117-147, October.
  3. Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  5. Vogl, Tom S., 2014. "Race and the politics of close elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-113.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Felix Mühe, 2008. "Vote-Buying and Growth," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/94, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  7. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
  8. Baland, Jean-Marie & Robinson, James A, 2011. "The Political Value of Land: Democratization and Land Prices in Chile," CEPR Discussion Papers 8296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Matias Iaryczower & Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Power Brokers: Middlemen in Legislative Bargaining," Economics Discussion Papers 731, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  10. Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying," LERNA Working Papers 12.19.376, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  11. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
  12. Costas Roumanias, 2008. "Auctioning Public Office," Discussion Paper Series 2008_08, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Sep 2008.

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  1. Economic Logic blog

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