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Vote Buying

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Author Info
Eddie Dekel (Tel-Aviv University)
Matthew O. Jackson (Catlech)
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0503/0503006.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Others with number 0503006.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0503006

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: vote buying; elections; campaign promises;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
  5. Philipson, Tomas J & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1996. " Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(3-4), pages 245-65, December.
  6. Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 191-202, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Neeman, Zvika, 1999. "The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 685-703, October.
  8. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Avinash Dixit, 1996. "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 375-388, Fall. [Downloadable!]
  10. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  13. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2006. "Turnout and Quorum in Referenda," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000230, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Iaryczower, Matias, . "Contestable leaderships: Party discipline and vote buying in legislatures," Working Papers 1255, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," IDEI Working Papers 492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jean-Marie Baland & James A. Robinson, 2006. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," NBER Working Papers 12517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Felix J. J. Vardy & John Morgan, 2007. "On the Buyability of Voting Bodies," IMF Working Papers 07/165, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hans Gersbach & Felix Mühe, 2008. "Vote-Buying and Growth," Economics working paper series 08/94, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sergiu Hart, 2008. "Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 441-460, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Felix J. J. Vardy & John Morgan, 2006. "Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying," IMF Working Papers 06/11, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ascensión Andina-Díaz & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2006. "Voting in small networks with cross-pressure," Discussion Papers 1438, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Helios Herrera & David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2007. "Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000935, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinksy, 2006. "Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying," Discussion Papers 1433, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2007. "A Positive Theory of Income Taxation," Departmental Working Papers 200706, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  14. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games," Micro Theory Working Papers han-06-01-19-06-37-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Casamatta, Georges & Vellutini, Charles, 2006. "Clientelism and Aid," CEPR Discussion Papers 5441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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