Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market

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Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market

Author Info

Philipson, Tomas J
Snyder, James M, Jr

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Tomas Philipson

Abstract

The authors study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market 'specialist.' This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and, whenever vote buying occurs, the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. The authors then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space and show that, if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 89 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 245-65
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:89:y:1996:i:3-4:p:245-65

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Alessandra Casella, 2002. "Storable votes," Discussion Papers 0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alessandra Casella, 2002. "Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Casella, Alessandra, 2002. "Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An experimental study of storable votes," Discussion Papers 0304-01, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," Working Papers 1173, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An experimental study of storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 123-154, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gersbach, Hans / Fahrenberger, Theresa, 2008. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2007. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," Economics working paper series 07/70, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinksy, 2006. "Vote Bying I: General Elections," Discussion Papers 1434, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Robert P. Inman, 1993. "Presidential Leadership and the Reform of Fiscal Policy: Learning from Reagan's Role in TRA 86," NBER Working Papers 4395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Debraj Ray & Kfir Eliaz & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," Working Papers 2004.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," CEPR Discussion Papers 4480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2007. "Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 236-273, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005. "Vote Buying," Others 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 039, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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