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Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

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Author Info
Gersbach, Hans

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Abstract

We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program. --

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2007-20.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567

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Related research
Keywords: democratic constitutions; minority voting; public projects;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Gersbach, Hans / Fahrenberger, Theresa, 2008. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ferejohn, John A., 1974. "Sour Notes on the Theory of Vote Trading," Working Papers 41, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.


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