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Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting

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Author Info
Theresa Fahrenberger () (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
Abstract

I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b < 1/2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the first ballot all voting winners, i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may benefit both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in the sphere of communal politics.

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Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 09/115.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-115

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Related research
Keywords: voting; minority; communal politics;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


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