Preferences for harmony and minority voting
AbstractWe examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 63 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004.
"Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-, September.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, . "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," IEW - Working Papers 129, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Volker Hahn, 2007.
"Fairness and voting,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 607-607, June.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2009.
"Minority voting and public project provision,"
Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal,
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 3(35), pages 1-40.
- Fahrenberger, Theresa & Gersbach, Hans, 2010.
"Minority voting and long-term decisions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 329-345, July.
- Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2008. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2198, CESifo Group Munich.
- Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2007. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/70, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Martin Sandbu, 2008. "Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 589-619, December.
- Hans Gersbach, 2011. "On the limits of democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 201-217, July.
- Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 69-84, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.