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Bad luck vs. self-inflicted neediness – An experimental investigation of gift giving in a solidarity game

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  • Nadja Trhal
  • Ralf Radermacher

Abstract

We experimentally examine the impact of self-inflicted neediness on the solidarity behavior of subjects. In one treatment in our solidarity experiment all subjects face the same probability of becoming needy, in the other treatment subjects have the choice between a secure payment and a lottery including a certain probability of becoming needy. Then we ask all subjects how much they will give to losers in their group thus investigating if people are willing to give the same gifts whether or not subjects are responsible for inequality in payoffs. We found evidence for allocative as well as for procedural utility concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadja Trhal & Ralf Radermacher, 2006. "Bad luck vs. self-inflicted neediness – An experimental investigation of gift giving in a solidarity game," Working Paper Series in Economics 28, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 07 Mar 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:kls:series:0028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Renate Strobl & Conny Wunsch, 2017. "Does Voluntary Risk Taking Affect Solidarity? Experimental Evidence from Kenya," CESifo Working Paper Series 6578, CESifo.
    2. Lübbe, Ingmar & Bolle, Friedel, 2011. "Who helps whom? Risk taking and solidarity in a virtual world experiment," Discussion Papers 310, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    3. Renate Strobl & Conny Wunsch, 2021. "Risky choices and solidarity: disentangling different behavioural channels," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1185-1214, December.
    4. Simone Gobien & Björn Vollan, 2016. "Exchanging Land for Solidarity: Solidarity Transfers among Voluntarily Resettled and Non-resettled Land-Reform Beneficiaries," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(3), pages 802-818.
    5. Marco Faillo & Luigi Mittone & Costanza Piovanelli, 2018. "Cash posters in the lab," CEEL Working Papers 1801, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    6. Strobl, Renate & Wunsch, Conny, 2018. "Risky Choices and Solidarity: Why Experimental Design Matters," Working papers 2018/17, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    7. Bolle, Friedel & Costard, Jano, 2013. "Who shows solidarity with the irresponsible?," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Jason Aimone & Daniel Houser, 2012. "What you don’t know won’t hurt you: a laboratory analysis of betrayal aversion," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 571-588, December.
    9. Kittel, Bernhard & Kanitsar, Georg & Traub, Stefan, 2017. "Knowledge, power, and self-interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 39-52.
    10. Gobien, Simone & Vollan, Björn, 2013. "Playing with the Social Network: Social Cohesion in Resettled and Non-Resettled Communities in Cambodia," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79985, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Landmann, Andreas & Vollan, Björn & Frölich, Markus, 2012. "Insurance versus Savings for the Poor: Why One Should Offer Either Both or None," IZA Discussion Papers 6298, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Costard, Jano & Bolle, Friedel, 2011. "Solidarity, responsibility and group identity," Discussion Papers 309, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    13. Ralf Radermacher & Johannes Brinkmann, 2011. "Insurance for the Poor?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 63-76, April.
    14. Lenel, Friederike & Steiner, Susan, 2017. "Insurance and Solidarity: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Cambodia," IZA Discussion Papers 10986, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    solidarity game; self-inflicted neediness; responsibility; procedural utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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