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A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda

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Author Info
Casella, Alessandra
Gelman, Andrew

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Abstract

Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken according to the majority of votes cast. We study the scheme in a number of different models and identify empirically plausible conditions under which ex ante utility increases, relative to simple majority voting.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-4SJG662-1/2/bb96ce1df2f758301b76695b3d322e78
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 92 (2008)
Issue (Month): 10-11 (October)
Pages: 2240-2261
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:10-11:p:2240-2261

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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Keywords: Referendum Voting Majority voting Large elections Storable votes Direct democracy;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alessandra Casella, 2002. "Storable votes," Discussion Papers 0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Matsusaka, John G, 1992. "Economics of Direct Legislation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 541-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An experimental study of storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 123-154, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007. "Qualitative Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Casella, Alessandra, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Colin Campbell, 2005. "Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative," Departmental Working Papers 200512, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control Theories and Experiments," Discussion Papers 0809-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alessandra Casella & Shuky Ehrenberg & Andrew Gelman & jie shen, 2008. "Protecting Minorities in Binary Elections: A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data," Discussion Papers 0708-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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