Protecting Minorities in Large Binary Elections. A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data
AbstractDemocratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multiple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the importance of the different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of the contests with 15--30 percent probability; and, when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85--95 percent probability. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the effect of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive.
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Date of creation: 22 Dec 2008
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Storable Votes; Referendums; Minorities; Majority Voting; Experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- Casella Alessandra & Ehrenberg Shuky & Gelman Andrew & Shen Jie, 2010. "Protecting Minorities in Large Binary Elections: A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, October.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2009-01-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-01-03 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2013.
"Voting chances instead of voting weights,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 164-173.
- Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Voting Chances Instead of Voting Weights," ISLA Working Papers 40, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2012. "Voting chances instead of voting weights," MPRA Paper 43059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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