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Minorities and Storable Votes

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Author Info
Alessandra Casella () (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
Thomas Palfrey () (Division of Humanities, Cal Tech)
Raymond Riezman () (Department of Economics, University of Iowa)

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Abstract

The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0059.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction," Working Paper Series in Economics 22, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007. "Qualitative Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Esteban Klor & Eyal Winter, 2007. "The welfare effects of public opinion polls," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 379-394, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 14487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control Theories and Experiments," Discussion Papers 0809-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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