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The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes

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Author Info
Ledyard, John O.
Palfrey, Thomas R.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 83 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 153-171
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:83:y:2002:i:2:p:153-171

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  1. Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman, 2005. "A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda," Discussion Papers 0506-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Patrick W. Schmitz & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Garbled Elections," Discussion Papers 195, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2003. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  7. Francesca Bortolami & Luigi Mittone, 2009. "Does Participating in a Collective Decision Affect the Levels of Contributions Provided? An Experimental Investigation," CEEL Working Papers 0902, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Travis Warziniack, 2009. "Efficiency of Public Goods Provision in Space," Working Papers 0483, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Søberg, Morten & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2003. "Voter Turnout in Direct Democracy: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series 596, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gersbach, Hans, 2005. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 5013, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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