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A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote

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Author Info
Chamberlain, Gary
Rothschild, Michael

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (1981)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 152-162
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:25:y:1981:i:1:p:152-162

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  1. Abdul Noury, 2004. "Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 179-211, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2008. "A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 231-246, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Casey B. Mulligan & Charles G. Hunter, 2000. "The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote," Working Papers 0025, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Londregan, John & Vindigni, Andrea, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Papers 10-04-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 2001. "A Strategic Calculus of Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000039, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld, 2005. "Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 1-18, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Strömberg, David, 2002. "Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," CEPR Discussion Papers 3372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Michael Munger, 2005. "Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 115-133, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Serguei Kaniovski, 2008. "The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 281-300, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N., 2001. "How Much does a Vote Count? Voting Power, Coalitions, and the Electoral College," Working Papers 1121, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Tuerlinckx, Francis, 2002. "The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power," Working Papers 1141, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  14. Filip Palda, 2001. "The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits," Public Economics 0111011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Strömberg, David, 2002. "Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," Seminar Papers 706, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  16. Jorge Andrés Gallego, 2007. "La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(16), pages 149-188, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  17. Andrew Gelman & Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, 2009. "What is the probability your vote will make a difference?," NBER Working Papers 15220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others," NBER Working Papers 13562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Katz, Jonathan N. & Gelman, Andrew & King, Gary, 2002. "Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College," Working Papers 1134, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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