All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.361
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," MPRA Paper 47587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Luski, Israel & Wettstein, David, 2003.
"Innovative activity and sunk cost,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1111-1133, October.
- Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000. "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Papers 2000-6, Tel Aviv.
- Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000. "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Discussion Papers 0006, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Chen Cohen & Todd R. Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2008.
"Optimal rewards in contests,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 434-451, June.
- Chen Cohen & Todd R. Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2004. "The Optimal Rewards in Contests," Discussion Papers 0402, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Chen Cohen & Todd R. Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2005. "The Optimal Rewards in Contests," Working Papers 0501, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Sela, Aner & Kaplan, Todd & Cohen, Chen, 2004. "Optimal Rewards in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 4704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kaplan, Todd, et al, 2002.
"All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 417-430, December.
- Todd Kaplan, 2001. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Discussion Papers 0109, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2006.
"Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1355-1360, September.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," MPRA Paper 6097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996.
"The all-pay auction with complete information (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper De Vries & Casper G, de Vries, 1995. "The All-pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 90, CESifo.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Other publications TiSEM 8739e73c-3375-40b8-b29b-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin, 2009.
"All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2009059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Rewards," Working Paper Series in Economics 46, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Subhashish Modak Chowdhury, 2009. "The all-pay auction with non-monotonic payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Ron Siegel, 2010. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2230-2260, December.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2001. "An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 79-82, January.
- Dario Sacco & Armin Schmutzler, 2008. "All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence," SOI - Working Papers 0806, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2017.
"The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 375-390, October.
- Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, 2010. "The All-Pay Auction with Non-Monotonic Payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin, 2009.
"All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2009059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Rewards," Working Paper Series in Economics 46, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023.
"Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015.
"Advances in Auctions,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Todd Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2015.
"The optimal design of rewards in contests,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 327-339, December.
- Kaplan, Todd & Wettstein, David, "undated". "The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests," Working Papers WP2010/6, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 22 Nov 2010.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2010. "The optimal design of rewards in contests," MPRA Paper 27397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefan Jönsson & Armin Schmutzler, 2013.
"All-pay auctions: Implementation and optimality,"
ECON - Working Papers
108, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Schmutzler, Armin & Jönsson, Stefan, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality," CEPR Discussion Papers 9323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aner Sela, 2016.
"Two Stage Contests With Effort-Dependent Rewards,"
Working Papers
1612, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Sela, Aner, 2016. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 11113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Subhashish Modak Chowdhury, 2009. "The all-pay auction with non-monotonic payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Aner Sela, 2017. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 253-272, December.
- Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
- Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2020.
"Contests with insurance,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Sela, Aner & Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2017. "Contests with Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 12456, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2019.
"A general framework for studying contests,"
MPRA Paper
97363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ron Seigel, 2009. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000201, David K. Levine.
- Aner Sela, 2012.
"Sequential two-prize contests,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 383-395, October.
- Aner Sela, 2008. "Sequential Two-Prize Contests," Working Papers 0803, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Sela, Aner, 2008. "Sequential Two-Prize Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023.
"Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 983-1007, May.
- Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine, 2021. "Equilibrium Existence and Expected Payoffs in All-Pay Auctions with Constraints," Economics Department Working Paper Series n311-21.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.
- Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022.
"Simple equilibria in general contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:361-377. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.