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An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium

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  • Amegashie, J. Atsu

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 70 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 79-82

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:70:y:2001:i:1:p:79-82

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Konrad, Kai A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1997. "Risk Aversion in Rent-Seeking and Rent-Augmenting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1671-83, November.
  3. Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  4. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
  5. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
  6. Dwight Lee, 1985. "Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 207-213, January.
  7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
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Cited by:
  1. Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," MPRA Paper 47587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin, 2009. "All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards," CORE Discussion Papers 2009059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2000. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Discussion Papers dp00-19, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised 19 Sep 2000.
  4. Amegashie, J.A., 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Immigration Quotas," Working Papers 2002-9, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  5. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.
  6. Amegashie, J.A., 2002. "Burning Out in Sequential Elimination Contests," Working Papers 2002-8, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  7. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury, 2009. "The all-pay auction with non-monotonic payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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