Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments
AbstractThis paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R& races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case. (JEL D44, D72, D82)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 100 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Jönsson, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2013.
"All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," MPRA Paper 47587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2012.
"Extremism Drives Out Moderation,"
12-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Szech, Nora & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2013. "Externalities in Recruiting," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 414, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2012. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem," Ruhr Economic Papers 0315, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
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