This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
VICKI BIER
SANTIAGO OLIVEROS
LARRY SAMUELSON

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option, and the defender prefers her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00320.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 563-587
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:4:p:563-587

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 489, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers iewwp137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2004. "Interdependent Security: A General Model," NBER Working Papers 10706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Darius Lakdawalla & George Zanjani, 2002. "Insurance, Self-Protection, and the Economics of Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 9215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "Terrorism: Deterrence May Backfire," IEW - Working Papers iewwp136, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  9. Todd Sandler, 2003. "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(6), pages 779-802, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. " Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-49, March-May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sandler, Todd & Lapan, Harvey E., 2003. "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets," Staff General Research Papers 10818, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2009. "The interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures: a two-stage game," Working Papers 2008-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.