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N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values

Author

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  • Caroline D. Thomas

    (Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new geometric method for constructing equilibrium distributions in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric battlefield values, generalizing the construction method of Laslier and Picard (2002). Our method does particularly well in instances of the Colonel Blotto game in which the battlefield values satisfy some clearly defined regularity conditions. The paper establishes the parallel between these conditions and the constrained integer partitioning problem in combinatorial optimisation. We illustrate in the context of the US presidential elections the properties of equilibrium distributions generated by our construction method. In a numerical example, we address the equity of campaign resource allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Caroline D. Thomas, 2009. "N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values," Department of Economics Working Papers 130116, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:tex:wpaper:130116
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
    2. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    3. Randall G. Chapman & Kristian S. Palda, 1984. "Assessing the Influence of Campaign Expenditures on Voting Behavior with a Comprehensive Electoral Market Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(3), pages 207-226.
    4. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Subhasish M Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2021. "Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1593-1619.
    2. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    3. Osorio, Antonio, 2013. "The lottery Blotto game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 164-166.
    4. Montero García, María & Possajennikow, Alex & Sefton, Martín & Turocy, Theodore L., 2013. "Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment," IKERLANAK 11222, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity," Working Papers 15-24, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2021. "Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 997-1032, April.
    7. Avrahami, Judith & Kareev, Yaakov & Todd, Peter M. & Silverman, Boaz, 2014. "Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 161-174.
    8. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Martin Sefton & Theodore Turocy, 2016. "Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 55-89, January.
    9. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    10. Scott Macdonell & Nick Mastronardi, 2015. "Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 183-216, January.
    11. Kostyantyn Mazur, 2017. "A Partial Solution to Continuous Blotto," Papers 1706.08479, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2017.

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