N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values
AbstractThis paper introduces a new geometric method for constructing equilibrium distributions in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric battlefield values, generalizing the construction method of Laslier and Picard (2002). Our method does particularly well in instances of the Colonel Blotto game in which the battlefield values satisfy some clearly defined regularity conditions. The paper establishes the parallel between these conditions and the constrained integer partitioning problem in combinatorial optimisation. We illustrate in the context of the US presidential elections the properties of equilibrium distributions generated by our construction method. In a numerical example, we address the equity of campaign resource allocations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 130116.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision: Aug 2013
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- Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
- Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
- Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
- Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Martin Sefton & Theodore Turocy, 2013.
"Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment,"
2013-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Montero García, Maria & Possajennikow, Alex & Sefton, Martín & Turocy, Theodore L., 2013. "Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2013-76, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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