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The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

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Author Info

  • Dan Kovenock
  • Brian Roberson
  • Roman M. Sheremeta

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1256.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1256

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Related research

Keywords: Colonel Blotto; conflict resolution; weakest-link; best-shot; multi-dimensional resource allocation; experiments;

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References

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  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers, University of Virginia, Department of Economics 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
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  3. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000158, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000532, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 52101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1253, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2009-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  9. Paul Milgrom, 2007. "Package Auctions and Exchanges," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 935-965, 07.
  10. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment," MPRA Paper 25497, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2010.
  11. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  12. Gneezy, Uri & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2006. "All-pay auctions--an experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 255-275, October.
  13. Tyler Moore & Richard Clayton & Ross Anderson, 2009. "The Economics of Online Crime," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 3-20, Summer.
  14. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  15. Potters, J.J.M. & Vries, C.G. de & Winden, F.A.A.M. van, 1998. "An experimental examination of rational rentseeking," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-79319, Tilburg University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Steven Tucker & Charles Noussair & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, 07.
  2. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman, 2012. "Fight or Flight?," MPRA Paper 52130, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Holt, Charles & Kydd, Andrew & Razzolini, Laura & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 56508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 12-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  5. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Baba Yumiko, 2012. "A Note on a Comparison of Simultaneous and Sequential Colonel Blotto Games," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 6, December.

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