Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker

Contents:

Author Info

  • Vicki Bier
  • Santiago Oliveros
  • Larry Samuelson

Abstract

We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option, and the defender prefers her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~larrysam/papers/Defense03.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (David K. Levine)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000158.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 21 Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000158

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2004. "Interdependent Security: A General Model," NBER Working Papers 10706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Todd Sandler, 2003. "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(6), pages 779-802, 06.
  4. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
  5. Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 489, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Sandler, Todd & Lapan, Harvey E., 1988. "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 10818, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "Terrorism: Deterrence May Backfire," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 136, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  8. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
  9. Lakdawalla, Darius & Zanjani, George, 2005. "Insurance, self-protection, and the economics of terrorism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1891-1905, September.
  10. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
  11. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. " Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-49, March-May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," CESifo Working Paper Series 3211, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Haphuriwat, N. & Bier, V.M., 2011. "Trade-offs between target hardening and overarching protection," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 213(1), pages 320-328, August.
  3. S. Goyal & A. Vigier, 2013. "Attack, Defense and Contagion in Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1327, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  5. Perea, Federico & Puerto, Justo, 2013. "Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 286-292.
  6. Christopher Cotton & Cheng Li, 2012. "Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment," Working Papers, University of Miami, Department of Economics 2013-02, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  7. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2009. "The interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures: a two-stage game," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2008-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  8. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman, 2012. "Fight or Flight?," MPRA Paper 52130, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series 2753, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. NORA, Vladyslav & UNO, Hiroshi, 2012. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2012050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Eiselt, H.A. & Bhadury, Joy & Burkey, Mark L., 2011. "An optimization-based framework for modeling counterterrorism strategies," MPRA Paper 36117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Bernhardt, Dan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2010. "Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 52-54, April.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000158. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.