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Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity

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Author Info
Jan Schnellenbach ()

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Abstract

Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 129 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 301-313
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:301-313

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Related research
Keywords: Terrorism; Deterrence; Reciprocity; Anti-terrorism policies;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test," KOF Working papers 08-185, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2009. "Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 313/2009, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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