Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
AbstractHow should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity--one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 107 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Hidden defenses Resource allocation Security Randomization Terrorism;
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