Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the “benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on “threats” and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.
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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number
iewwp137.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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