How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence

Author Info

Bruno S. Frey
Simon Luechinger

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the “benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on “threats” and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number iewwp137.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:137

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Hanna Britt).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-12-09 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2002-12-09 (Law & Economics)
NEP-MIC-2002-12-19 (Microeconomics)
NEP-PBE-2002-12-09 (Public Economics)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Tilman Brück, 2005. "An Economic Analysis Of Security Policies," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(5), pages 375-389, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Tilman Brück, 2004. "An Economic Analysis of Security Policies," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 456, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Tilman Brück, 2004. "An Economic Analysis of Security Policies," HiCN Working Papers 06, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
Krug, B. & Reinmoeller, P., 2003. "The Hidden Cost of Ubiquity: Globalisation and Terrorism," Research Paper ERS-2003-062-ORG Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2008. "What causes terrorism?," Working Papers 12, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000158, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2005. "Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism," IEW - Working Papers iewwp257, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2005. "Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-31, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
- Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 245-252. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test," Working papers 08-185, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Axel Dreher & Justina A.V. Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-01, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
- Dreher, Axel & Fischer, Justina AV, 2007. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 686, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Bruno Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Valuing Public Goods: The Life Satisfation Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, . "Valuing Public Goods: The Life Satisfaction Approach," IEW - Working Papers iewwp184, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Valuing Public Goods: The Life Satisfaction Approach," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-11, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
Jan Schnellenbach, 2005. "Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity," Law and Economics 0507001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 301-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "Measuring Terrorism," IEW - Working Papers iewwp171, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce M., 2005. "Terror Support And Recruitment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 263-273, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Phillips, 2005. "THE 'PRICE’ OF TERRORISM," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(6), pages 403-414, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Hilsenrath, 2005. "Health Policy As Counter-Terrorism: Health Services And The Palestinians," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(5), pages 365-374, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul Dunne & Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine Author Name: Ron Smith, 2004. "Managing Asymmetric Conflict," Studies in Economics 0411, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- J. Paul Dunne & María D.C. García-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron P. Smith, 2006. "Managing asymmetric conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 183-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Entorf, 2005. "Islamistischer Terrorismus: Analysen, Entwicklungen und Anti- Terror-Politik aus der Sicht ökonomischer Forschung," General Economics and Teaching 0508001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Horst Entorf, 2005. "Islamistischer Terrorismus: Analysen, Entwicklungen und Anti-Terrorpolitik aus der Sicht ökonomischer Forschung," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 149, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2007. "Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," Working papers 07-156, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2007. "Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2005. "On Rational Choice Theory And The Study Of Terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 275-282, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism," Working Papers 0412, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Franz Dietrich, 2004. "Terrorism Prevention: A General Model," Others 0404001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.