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An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

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  • Chowdhury, Subhasish M.
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Sheremeta, Roman M.

Abstract

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. -- Dieser Artikel untersucht das Verhalten von Individuen in einem „constant-sum Colonel Blotto“-Spiel zwischen zwei Spielern, bei dem die Spieler mit unterschiedlichen Ressourcen ausgestattet sind und die erwartete Anzahl gewonnener Schlachtfelder maximieren. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse bestätigen alle wichtigen theoretischen Vorhersagen. Im Durchgang, in dem wie in einer Auktion der Sieg in einem Schlachtfeld deterministisch ist, wenden die Spieler, die sich im Nachteil befinden, eine „Guerillataktik“ an, und verteilen ihre Ressourcen stochastisch auf eine Teilmenge der Schlachtfelder. Spieler mit einem Vorteil verwenden eine Strategie der „stochastischen vollständigen Abdeckung“, indem sie zufällig eine positive Ressourcenmenge auf allen Schlachtfeldern positionieren. Im Durchgang, in dem sich der Gewinn eines Schlachtfeldes probabilistisch wie in einer Lotterie bestimmt, teilen beide Spieler ihre Ressourcen gleichmäßig auf alle Schlachtfelder auf.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2009-08.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200908

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Related research

Keywords: Colonel Blotto; conflict resolution; contest theory; multi-dimensional; resource allocation; rent-seeking; experiments;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Steven Tucker & Charles Noussair & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, 07.
  2. Michael McBride & David Hewitt, 2012. "The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks," Working Papers 121307, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Brian Roberson & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2010. "The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1252, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  4. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 12-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  5. Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2692, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Arad, Ayala & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2012. "Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the Colonel Blotto game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 571-585.
  7. Godinho, Pedro & Dias, Joana, 2013. "Two-player simultaneous location game: Preferential rights and overbidding," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 229(3), pages 663-672.
  8. Stefan Homburg, 2011. "Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, 02.
  9. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Martin Sefton & Theodore Turocy, 2013. "Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 2013-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  10. Cary Deck & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Fight or Flight?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(6), pages 1069-1088, December.
  11. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1256, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  12. Denter, Philipp, 2013. "A theory of communication in political campaigns," Economics Working Paper Series 1302, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  13. Sudipta Sarangi & Dan Kovenock & Matt Wiser, . "All-Pay Hex: A Multibattle Contest With Complementarities," Departmental Working Papers 2012-06, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  14. John Duffy & Alexander Matros, 2013. "Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 509, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.

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