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How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paul Klemperer () (Nuffield College, Oxford University )
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There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number
2002-W5.
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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2001Date of revision:
01 Nov 2001Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0205Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Catherine McNeill).
Keywords: Auctions Telecommunications Spectrum Auctions 3G UMTS Bidding. Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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Wellenius, Bjorn & Neto, Isabel, 2005.
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"The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences ,"
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3214, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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"The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses ,"
Economics Papers
2002-W4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
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