A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information
AbstractThis article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Yasar Barut & Dan Kovenock & Charles Noussair, 1999. "A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998.
"Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer,"
Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
- Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. " Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
- Potters, Jan & de Vries, Casper G. & van Winden, Frans, 1998.
"An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 783-800, November.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Vries, C.G. de & Winden, F.A.A.M. van, 1998. "An experimental examination of rational rentseeking," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-79319, Tilburg University.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-99, November.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
- Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
- Holt, Charles A, Jr & Sherman, Roger, 1982. "Waiting-Line Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 280-94, April.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2000. "Auction Theory from an All-Pay View: Buying Binary Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series 382, CESifo Group Munich.
- Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006.
"The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1782, CESifo Group Munich.
- Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009. "The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
- Sander Onderstal & Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Rupert Sausgruber, 2004. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 2004.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Richard B. Freeman, 2006. "Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament," NBER Working Papers 12588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013.
"Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments,"
13-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," MPRA Paper 44124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Oliver Kirchkamp,, 2006.
"Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions,"
CRIEFF Discussion Papers
0607, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2008. "Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-023, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters & Konrad Podczeck, 2006.
"All-pay Auctions with Budget Constraints and Fair Insurance,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0605, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters & Konrad Podczeck, 2006. "All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance," Economics working papers 2006-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious & Aner Sela, 2006. "All-pay auctions with risk-averse players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 583-599, November.
- Noussair, Charles & Silver, Jonathon, 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 189-206, April.
- Fehr, Dietmar & Schmid, Julia, 2010. "Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2010-04, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011.
"An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games,"
46810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhasish Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2013. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 833-861, April.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock J. & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group Munich.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Hironori Otsubo, 2013. "Do campaign spending limits diminish competition? An experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2223-2234.
- Christiane Ernst & Christian Thöni, 2013. "Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 608-623, October.
- Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 201301, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.