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Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

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Author Info
Nicolas Sahuguet ()
Nicola Persico

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Abstract

We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-005-0610-0
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 95-124
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:1:p:95-124

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Related research
Keywords: Campaign spending regulation; Redistributive politics.;

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  1. Zakharov Alexei, 2005. "Candidate location and endogenous valence," EERC Working Paper Series 05-17e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock J. & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kovenock, Dan & Robertson, Brian, 2005. "Electoral Poaching and Party Identification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1178, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-Of-War," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1177, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2008. "Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers," Working Papers 2008-20, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Jenny De Freitas, 2009. "Political support for the private system to finance political parties," DEA Working Papers 35, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada. [Downloadable!]
  7. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 195-210, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Papers 120, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2007. "Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient Redistributive Politics," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1206, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862. [Downloadable!]
  14. Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2008. "An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00267218_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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