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Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

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  • Daniel G. Arce
  • Dan Kovenock
  • Brian Roberson

Abstract

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(6), pages 457-469, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:59:y:2012:i:6:p:457-469
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.21500
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2005. "IDS Models of Airline Security," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 201-217, April.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2002. "Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(1), pages 17-27, February.
    3. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Hadi Yektaş & Magnus Hoffmann & Friedhelm Hentschel & Roland Hodler, 2019. "Wars of Conquest and Independence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(4), pages 617-640.
    3. Samuel Häfner, 2022. "Eternal peace in the tug-of-war?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1057-1101, November.
    4. Arce, Daniel G., 2015. "WikiLeaks and the risks to critical foreign dependencies," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 11(C), pages 3-11.
    5. Timothy Mathews & Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria, 2019. "Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 287-299, June.
    6. Opher Baron & Oded Berman & Arieh Gavious, 2018. "A Game Between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 27(3), pages 433-457, March.
    7. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023. "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 117-155, March.
    8. Michael J. Armstrong, 2014. "Modeling Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense and Israel's Iron Dome System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1028-1039, October.
    9. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2023. "How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 493-500.
    10. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    11. Li, Yapeng & Qiao, Shun & Deng, Ye & Wu, Jun, 2019. "Stackelberg game in critical infrastructures from a network science perspective," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 705-714.
    12. Sushil Gupta & Martin K. Starr & Reza Zanjirani Farahani & Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi, 2020. "Prevention of Terrorism–An Assessment of Prior POM Work and Future Potentials," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1789-1815, July.
    13. Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1122-1129.
    14. Chaoqi, Fu & Yangjun, Gao & Jilong, Zhong & Yun, Sun & Pengtao, Zhang & Tao, Wu, 2021. "Attack-defense game for critical infrastructure considering the cascade effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    15. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2015. "An Experiment on Non-Zero Sum Colonel Blotto Games," Working Papers 779, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

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