Attack, Defense and Contagion in Networks
AbstractConnections between individuals facilitate the exchange of goods, resources and information and create benefits. These connections may be exploited by adversaries to spread their attacks as well. What is the optimal way to design and defend networks in the face of attacks We develop a model with a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer moves first and chooses a network and an allocation of defense resources across nodes. The Adversary then allocates attack resources on nodes and determines how successful attacks should navigate the network. Our main result is that, in a wide variety of circumstances, a star network with all defense resources allocated to the central hub node is optimal for the Designer. The Adversary targets undefended peripheral nodes; upon capture of these nodes the resources mount a concerted attack on the center.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1327.
Date of creation: 15 Aug 2013
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Networks; computer security; Tullock contests; connectivity;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-08-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-08-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-08-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-08-23 (Network Economics)
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