Friends and Enemies: A Model of Signed Network Formation
AbstractI propose a game of signed network formation, where agents make friends to coerce payoffs from enemies with fewer friends. The model accounts for the interplay between friendship and enmity. Nash equilibrium configurations are such that, either everyone is friends with everyone, or agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are friends and agents in different sets are enemies. These results mirror findings of a large body of work on signed networks in sociology, social psychology, international relations and applied physics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series Bristol Economics Discussion Papers with number 12/629.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Network Formation; Structural Balance; Alliances; Contest Success Function;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-02-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-02-08 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-02-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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