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Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality


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  • Dan Kovenock
  • Michael J. Mauboussin
  • Brian Roberson


This article examines a two-stage model of asymmetric conflict based on the classic Colonel Blotto game in which players have, in the first stage, the ability to increase the number of battlefields contested. It thereby endogenizes the “dimensionality” of conflict. In equilibrium, if the asymmetry in the players’ resource endowments exceeds a threshold, the weak player chooses to add battlefields, while the strong player never does. Adding battlefields spreads the strong player’s forces more thinly, increasing the incidence of favorable strategic mismatches for the weak player.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1259.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1259

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Keywords: Asymmetric Conflict; Multi-battle Conflict; Colonel Blotto Game; Stochastic Guerilla Warfare; Endogenous Dimensionality;

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Cited by:
  1. David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.


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