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Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy

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  • Vincent Anesi
  • Philippe De Donder

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Abstract

The paper develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between political party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than in terms of the proportion of voters who care for the environment. We build on Levy (2004) for the political equilibrium concept, defined as the solution to a two stage game where politicians first form parties and where parties then compete by choosing a policy bundle in order to win the elections. We obtain the following results: i) The Pigouvian tax never emerges in an equilibrium; ii) The equilibrium environmental tax is larger when there is a minority of green voters; iii) Stable green parties exist only if there is a minority of green voters and income polarization is large enough relative to the saliency of the environmental issue. We also study the redistributive policies advocated by green parties.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 36 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 519-546

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:519-546

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References

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  1. Hubert Kempf & Stéphane Rossignol, 2006. "Is inequality harmful for the environment in a growing economy ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00117046, HAL.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "A Coalitional Theory of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  2. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Pineau, Pierre-Olivier, 2012. "Regulation and electricity market integration: When trade introduces inefficiencies," MPRA Paper 41251, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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