Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict
AbstractContestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.
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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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- Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Easy targets and the timing of conflict," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-28, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Easy targets and the timing of conflict," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 21, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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