In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EconomÃa in its series Economics Working Papers with number
we081508.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007.
"Political Bias and War,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1353-1373, September.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, .
"Political bias and war,"
Working Papers
1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]