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Easy targets and the timing of conflict

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  • Bester, Helmut
  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Goettingen, Department of Economics in its series Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers with number 21.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:21

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Keywords: Timing of conflict; war; easy targets;

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References

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  3. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, . "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," Claremont Colleges Working Papers, Claremont Colleges 2001-02, Claremont Colleges.
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  7. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  9. Skaperdas, Stergios, 2003. "Restraining the genuine homo economicus: why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  10. Pindyck, Robert S, 1991. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-48, September.
  11. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A, 2003. "Delay in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
  13. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September.
  14. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  15. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December.
  16. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
  17. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
  18. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1997. " Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 109-26, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. J. Atsu Amegashie & Edward Kutsoati, 2005. "(Non)Intervention In Intra-State Conflicts," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 0504, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  2. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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