This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Unobserved Delegation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Chaim Fershtman
Ehud Kalai

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1043.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1043.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1043

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Phone: 847/491-3527
Fax: 847/491-2530
Email:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fran Walker).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. repec:fth:harver:1502 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert Ritz, 2005. "Strategic incentives for market share," Economics Series Working Papers 248, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. V. Bhaskar, 2004. "Games Played in a Contracting Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 583, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2003. "Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains," CEPR Discussion Papers 3976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Amegashie, J.A. & Kutsoati, E., 2005. "(Non) Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts," Working Papers 2005-4, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Helmut Bester & J?sef S?ovics, . "Delegated Bargaining And Renegotiation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 440.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Heifetz, Aviad & Spiegel, Yossi, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergency of Optimism," Working Papers 1104, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  11. Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 461-470. [Downloadable!]
  12. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
  13. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156. [Downloadable!]
  15. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games," Micro Theory Working Papers han-06-01-19-06-37-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond, 2004. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 42, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Marcello D'Amato, 2004. "Commitment of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CSEF Working Papers 117, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 150000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.