Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions
AbstractIn a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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