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Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

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Author Info

  • Konrad, Kai A.

    (Free University of Berlin)

  • Peters, Wolfgang

    (The European University Viadrina)

  • Wärneryd, Karl

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 316.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 22 Apr 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0316

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Related research

Keywords: First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation;

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References

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  1. Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June.
  2. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  3. Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
  4. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  5. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  6. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.
  7. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Spatial contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 965-974, August.
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2009. "A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 205-232, September.
  2. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "Divisionalization in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 89-93, January.
  3. Rosar, Frank, 2013. "Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79812, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Kutsoati, Edward, 2007. "(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 754-767, September.
  5. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
  6. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156.
  7. Krakel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 119-136.

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