Who Is The Enemy?

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Who Is The Enemy?

Author Info

Gil Epstein
Ira Gang

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Abstract

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 469-484
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Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:18:y:2007:i:6:p:469-484

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Paper
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2004. "Who Is the Enemy?," IZA Discussion Papers 1237, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Epstein, Gil S & Gang, Ira, 2004. "Who is the Enemy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2004. "Who Is the Enemy?," Departmental Working Papers 200427, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Claude Berrebi, 2007. "Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians," Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 13(1), pages 2. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Claude Berrebi, 2003. "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians," Working Papers 856, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 447-453, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 2003. "Terrorism and Signalling," Staff General Research Papers 10808, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.

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