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Who Is The Enemy?

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Author Info

  • Gil Epstein
  • Ira Gang

Abstract

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690701331485
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 469-484

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Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:18:y:2007:i:6:p:469-484

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Related research

Keywords: Terrorism; Rent-seeking; All-pay auction; Lottery;

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References

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
  3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & Vries, C. de, 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 447-453, June.
  6. Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  7. Gil S . Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October.
  8. Dwight Lee & Todd Sandler, 1989. "On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 141-152, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Hendel, Ulrich, 2012. ""Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations," Discussion Papers in Economics 13998, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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