Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff
AbstractWe analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 45 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jme
Other versions of this item:
- Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, 1996. "Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff," NBER Working Papers 5510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, 1996. "Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 124, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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