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Economie politique de la politique d'ouverture commerciale mixte : interactions entre les groupes sociaux et l'Etat

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  • Pierre-Olivier Peytral

    ()
    (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - CNRS : FRE2664 - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II)

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    Abstract

    L'analyse de la politique commerciale dans le modèle Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) conclut à la supériorité du libre-échange sur la protection compte tenu de ses effets sur l'économie nationale. Cette contribution propose de donner une explication au paradoxe auquel fait face cette conclusion théorique : la permanence historique des mesures simultanées de libre-échange et de protection sélective. Ce paradoxe constitue le sujet d'analyse d'un courant théorique d'économie politique : l'économie politique de la politique d'ouverture commerciale. L'objet est d'expliciter les différents déterminants endogènes de cette politique (groupes sociaux, gouvernement et bureaucratie), politique qualifiée de politique d'ouverture commerciale mixte. Les approches expliquant les différents déterminants endogènes sont présentées successivement pour aboutir à la conclusion que ce sont les interactions entre les groupes sociaux, la bureaucratie et le gouvernement qui permettent de comprendre les choix effectifs de politique.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00104875.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00104875

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    Keywords: politique commerciale ; économie politique ; protectionnisme ; libre-échange ; gouvernement ; Etat ; modèle Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson;

    References

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