Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A "New" Perspective on Protectionism

Contents:

Author Info

  • Arnaud Costinot

Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions. In this environment, jobs generate rents whose access depends on the level of trade protection. By raising the domestic price of a good, a government may attract more firms in a particular industry. This raises the probability that workers will find jobs in this sector, and in turn, will benefit from the associated rents. Though simple, this channel may help explain a variety of stylized facts on the structure of trade protection and individual trade-policy preferences. (JEL: F130, F160) (c) 2009 by the European Economic Association.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1542-4774/issues
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 7 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Pages: 1011-1041

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:5:p:1011-1041

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea

Order Information:
Web: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Mansfield, Edward D. & Busch, Marc L., 1995. "The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 723-749, September.
  3. Neal, Derek, 1995. "Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 653-77, October.
  4. Matschke, Xenia N. & Sherlund, Shane M, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0sn637k8, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  5. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, 1999. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: a Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," Working Papers 9912, Economic Research Forum, revised Apr 1999.
  6. Shubham Chaudhuri & John McLaren, 2007. "Some Simple Analytics of Trade and Labor Mobility," NBER Working Papers 13464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. repec:fth:ecrefo:9912 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Donald R. Davis & James Harrigan, 2007. "Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 13139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. K. H. O'Rourke & R. Sinnott, 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence," CEG Working Papers 20016, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  10. Oleg Itskhoki & Elhanan Helpman, 2008. "Labor Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment," 2008 Meeting Papers 690, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Hansen, John Mark, 1990. "Taxation and the political economy of the tariff," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(04), pages 527-551, September.
  12. Hartmut Egger & Udo Kreickemeier, 2007. "Firm Heterogeneity and the Labour Market Effects of Trade Liberalisation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2000, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence & Matusz, Steven, 1999. "Trade and search generated unemployment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-299, August.
  15. Elhanan Helpman, 1995. "Politics and Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 5309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. J. Michael Finger & Ann Harrison, 1996. "The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, pages 197-260 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Bohara, Alok K & Kaempfer, William H, 1991. "A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 952-60, September.
  18. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
  19. Anderson, Kym, 1980. "The Political Market for Government Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 56(153), pages 132-44, June.
  20. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  21. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
  22. Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May.
  23. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
  24. Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence & Matusz, Steven, 1994. "Jobs and Chocolate: Samuelsonian Surpluses in Dynamic Models of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 173-92, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Antràs, Pol & Costinot, Arnaud, 2010. "Intermediated Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 7696, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Emanuel Ornelas, 2012. "Preferential Trade Agreements and the Labor Market," CEP Discussion Papers dp1117, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  3. Wolf-Heimo Grieben & Fuat Sener, 2009. "Labor Unions, Globalization, and Mercantilism," CESifo Working Paper Series 2889, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Céline CARRERE & Marco FUGAZZA & Marcelo OLARREAGA & Frédéric ROBERT-NICOUD, 2014. "Trade in Unemployment," Working Papers P101, FERDI.
  5. Ludema, Rodney D & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2010. "Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7926, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:5:p:1011-1041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.